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Hideg, É.: Paradigms in Futures Field. Futures Theories 21. CUB, Budapest, 2012.

https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1900/

 Contribution to the theoretical questions of foresight

by Éva Hideg

Introductory thoughts, methodological considerations

Foresight concepts as well as the practice of foresight are currently governed by socio-cultural constructionism (Sardar-Ravetz, 1994, Inayatullah, 2002). Foresight is the notion individuals and/or their communities have vis-à-vis shaping their own future, the way the future exists in the present in thoughts, ideas, emotions, expectations, values and the guiding principles of actions. People interpret the world around them and their predicament in it formulating the vision of the future desirable for themselves and/or for their communities, as well as their emotional attitude to the future, through assessment, thinking and the creation of visions. The act of interpreting, however, always depends on the social and cultural environment, and the ideas and conjectures related to the future are constructed, just as society and culture are constructed, by man.

Foresight has no well-elaborated and generally-accepted theory at the moment, which is why we can still encounter a wide variety of foresight concepts and practices. Yet it is not the different foresight concepts that I set out to analyse in my bid to contribute to theory-making, as that has already been done by specialist literature. (See, for example, Martin-Irvine, 1989, Miles, 1997, Skumanich-Silbernagel, 1997, Karp, 2004, Country Specific…, 2002, Von Schomberg-Guimares Pereira-Funtowitz, 2005). According to specialist literature, there are two main types of foresight concepts and practices: one being foresight as understood in Futures Studies (hereafter abbreviated as FSF for Futures Studies foresight), and the other being a kind of foresight that stems from the needs of practice but one that increasingly dissociates itself from and makes itself independent of Futures Studies, which is present mostly in European technology, regional and social foresights in the making; (I call the latter foresight concepts foresight serving special practice needs, practice foresight, PF for short). I believe that the comparative analysis of these two types of foresight concepts and practices will shed light on their similarities as well as their different intentions and the roles they play in society and intellectual life. By means of this analysis I will be able to pinpoint distinct features of the theoretical foundation and weaknesses of foresight which may help to chart the course of further theoretical research. Finally, I wish to outline a possible way of extending the theory of foresight by presenting a dynamic approach.

Comparative analysis of FSF and PF

Slaughter was the first to define foresight in Futures Studies literature (Slaughter, 1995). He determined foresight as “…a universal human capacity which allows people to think ahead, consider, model, create and respond to future eventualities. Founded on the rich and inclusive environment of the human brain-mind system which, crudely put, has sufficiently complex neural ‘wiring’ to support an extended mode of perception whose main functions are proactive and facilitating.” (Slaughter, 2004). Futures Studies (FS) uses the notion and practices foresighting basically in keeping with his concept and theory. Slaughter’s concept, however, is not without antecedents, since Dator (1979), Masini (1983), Galtung (1984), the prospective concept of the French (De Jouvenel, 1964, Godet, 1993) had stood for human future being created by man well before the notion of foresight emerged. They had already voiced their opinion as regards the forecasts made then, namely that social and human future partly hinges on man’s choices and responsibility as well.

Based on Slaughter’s concept foresight in Futures Studies is conceived on the individual’s level but can be extended to a community or the whole of society. An individual is able to envisage both his own and his community’s future. The thoughts and ideas in relation to the future of the community are developed among the subjects of social discourse and are embedded in the process of social innovation until they reach the phase of shaping the future. Both anticipating individual and community futures and their future-shaping effect carry great weight in this process (Slaughter, 1995). The FSF concept, however, attributes the decisive role to the individual in making foresights vis-à-vis his own and his community’s future and in thus forming society. This is why FS is so wont to deal with the future orientation of individuals, with developing it, with the future orientation of young people, the future of education, the voluntary futures movements, shaping the vision of the future of social groups and the vision of the future of mankind; furthermore, it considers participation in shaping politics important. FSF theories came about and continue to develop within the theoretical framework of FS even though the latter still cannot be regarded as fully fledged and generally accepted (Hideg, 2002).

The type of foresight that provides direct answers to the needs of practice, i.e. PF (which first emerged as technology foresight but by now exists in the form of regional and other so-called institutional foresights as well) was born as a participative, consensus-building process aimed at shaping subjective visions of the future on the communal or social level. Its principal objective is to influence political decision-making (Cf. studies by Martin-Irvine 1989, Miles 1997, Fuller 1999 and Havas 2003). PF dissociates itself from FSF, because it rejects the possible predictivity of human future and regards as its task only the shaping of future(s) desirable on the communal or social level. FS and FSF appear as no more than background information in the outer circle of PF activity (Cf. the studies of Country Specific…, 2002, Keenan-Miles-Koi-Ova, 2003, Von Schomberger-Guimares Pereira-Funtowitz, 2005). The theoretical bases of PF, however, are limited to the mere acceptance of the general conditions of socio-cultural constructionism. Yet its practical successes urge it more and more forcefully to develop its own theory.

What can possibly be the reason why the two foresight concepts differ so much and why they wish to distance themselves from each other even more in the future? I see two reasons for this: to break definitively 1. with the notion of the predictivity of human future, and 2. with the individualist-elitist overtone concealed in FSF.

The train of thought of the definitive break with the notion of the predictivity of human future is as follows. Human-social future is non-predictive, as social forecasts do not come true and predictivity is philosophically unacceptable. Most reference is made to Popper’s argumentation (Popper, 1975), according to whom society has no laws because society consists of human acts and is man-made even though the way people live, think and act is culturally determined by social conditions and circumstances. Forecasts regarding the future of society are, therefore, either self-fulfilling or self-refuting prophecies depending on the course of action people choose to take. The future of society will be good, and this good future will materialise only if people consider it good and act in the interest of that desirable future. This is why PF undertakes to help and bring to the fore as well as create the future(s) desirable for social communities, and to forward that/those to the sphere of policy-making.

One of the shortcomings of this extremely simplified train of thought is that, if the future of society is non-predictive, it does not necessarily entail that all types of imagined futures, including the desirable future, can actually materialise. The fact that social future is non-predictive means merely that we cannot take into account in advance all the factors that determine the future. That people’s expectations and acts cannot be predicted in advance is but one of the reasons for this. The other, just as significant, reason is that the final outcome of intended human acts may not necessarily coincide with the original intentions, since factors independent of human intentions and will (e.g. the natural and artificial environment and the activity of other social groups or societies) also have a bearing on the outcome of human acts. A third reason is that the future of society is shaped by a continuous interaction of factors in which chance too comes into play.

Formulating the desirable futures of social communities and societies in present-day societies, particularly in democracies, can in effect be achieved through consensus-building, and the vision of a desirable future becomes a success when it is articulated in a political will. Yet politics is a means of social construction available anyway, and it has functioned and can continue to function well even without foresight. There are innumerable examples, however, to illustrate that even politics cannot shape social reality according to its own will. For one thing, even politics is unaware of all the factors shaping the future even though it has power over society and employs force to influence it. For another, politics is primarily about keeping power, because modern societies and social institutions are hierarchically structured. The idea that a desirable vision of the future can be formulated and realized for all the social groups through consensus-building is, therefore, utopian and voluntarist.

History has seen the failure of certain policies based on a desirable future. Communism was one such outstanding historical example, among others. Its failure, for the record, was in no small measure due, however, to the absence of a social consensus behind it. Yet even if it had enjoyed the backing of a social consensus, it would have failed all the same because it was mistaken in sizing up and interpreting the impact of the outside world (the given technological, economic and natural environmental barriers) on society and on the different visions of the future. At the same time we must also realize that a social consensus can also hinder innovation, change and experimentation with and the emergence of new creative futures if it leaves no manoeuvring room for ideas and actions diverging from the existing consensus. From this point of view it is also worth recalling the thoughts of Funtowitz and Ravetz concerning the emerging complex systems, namely social systems, whose principal peculiarity, differentiating them from other complex systems, is that their symbolic representations and objectives always take the shape of alternativities (Funtowicz-Ravetz, 1994).

While political consensus-building follows well-defined rules in the case of societies and social institutions, no rules whatsoever, only different procedures at best, exist in PF. Furthermore, the nature of consensus-building is not well-defined in PF. Unequivocal answers have yet to be provided to questions such as to what extent PF should be involved in the teaching, learning and, possibly, manipulating of its participants, or to what extent PF should be active in featuring and integrating into policy-making innovations by experts and concerned laymen. This is important because PF focuses on the consensus-building process, which it considers its principal characteristic feature, as well as the foundation of its endeavours to formulate theories. At the same time, specialist literature rates PF according to the individual qualities its management possesses. (Skumanich-Silbernagel, 1997, Salo-Könnöla-Hjelt, 2004). The eventuality of subjective solutions is no safe ground to formulate theories on.

Man cannot have complete freedom even in the most democratic of societies. Not only is his freedom curtailed by others, but there are also other factors that amount to impediments. Such are, for instance, resources, infrastructure, the artificial world and the limitations arising out of the natural environment and its peculiar laws of functioning. PF may easily reach an impasse should it disregard these irrespective of the fact that it may embody the outcome a consensus reached in keeping with the tried and tested rules of the game. Unfortunately, no thorough case study has been conducted to date on experience gathered in the field of implementing PFs or of their materialising.

The fact that PF overemphasizes the nature of consensus-building gives rise to yet another disadvantage form the point of view of theory-making. This is none other than the endeavour to eliminate the open character of the future. Reaching a consensus in relation to the future does daily politics a good turn indeed, as it leaves politics nothing but to carry out implementation. But this eliminates the openness of the future only seemingly, temporarily and dangerously, and poses some risks. Seemingly because every act and its new outcome constitute new conditions for the act next in line. These new conditions, however, do not necessarily support the further implementation of a consensus-based future. The follow-up activity which forms a part of PF ought to inform about this. Supposing the follow-up is going without a hitch, the consensus-based future might still cause a problem, as the new facts give rise to new and different interpretations, thus upsetting the consensus reached with hard work in any moment in the future. Consensus, therefore, always belongs to a given moment in time, and there is no guarantee whatsoever that it can serve daily politics for a longer while even if politics relies on its power as well to enforce the consensus-based future. It is, therefore, advisable, to distinguish desirable futures from the consensus-based future, or to interpret the consensus-based future, as does FSF (Nováky, 2001), as a consensus-based future province and, within that, in acceptable alternatives. This takes us back to the concept of the future embodied in FSF, which would leave us with no sufficient grounds to think up differing theories. The advantage of conceiving the consensus-based future as a future province is that there can always be visions of the future that will provide the framework for the quest of yet another consensus-based future. In other words, if the future is open to start with, then PF ought to deal with it as open, as does FS. The risk of the consensus-based future of PF is that it focuses only on the desirable future, though it ought to consider and keep in mind wild cards as well. PF does not undertake this at all, something that leaves a lot to be desired. FSF, on the other hand, embraces these possible futures too.

The turn against the individualist-elitist overtone can be detected in two different aspects in PF concepts. One is apparent in the way of treating individual foresights, while the other emerges from the evaluation of the role of the individual futures researcher.

PF as a process building social consensus always endeavours to formulate the vision of a desirable future for a certain community. It considers the future orientation and vision of the future of the individual important only in as much as it serves as a source for the formulation of visions of the desirable future of a community. FSF, on the other hand, emphasizes the individual, as only he/she can contemplate his/her future and that of the community. FSF also regards the implementation of desirable futures important both on the individual and the community level, but it does not expect the individual’s future to be completely subjected to the community’s future. After all, real societies make different courses of life possible; in fact, the more freedom there is in a given society, the greater the differences between the desirable futures too. Community level common futures tend to be some kind of common denominators, common frameworks for interpretation which allow a wide variety of individual futures.

Despite the fact that PF considers consensus-building as its central task, it does not consider it important to research how the community-level desirable future is formulated from individual foresights. FSF considers this question an important area of research precisely because individual foresights guide each person’s actions related to the future; juxtaposing and harmonizing individual foresights and moulding them into a community foresight without making them lose validity, for the life of the individual gains importance in cooperation with other people, in communal activities. Individual and community foresights must, therefore, always have common ground, but in a way that they allow individual foresights to function beside and together with them.

According to PF, FSF is elitist in as much as it continues to treat the futures researcher as a privileged individual who regularly deals with the futures of communities as well as the futures of individuals, with futures theories and developing methodology instead of being limited to applying the mechanisms of consensus-building to shaping future images. According to PF, the futures researcher does not have to tell the future, for he cannot know it, nor forecast what kind of common future people are prepared to work for. All that is needed is a foresight manager, who knows how to bring individual foresight to the surface, how to merge them into community-level desirable futures or foresights. According to FSF, however, a futures researcher can be a foresight manager, but must continue as a sociologist too, who deals with the possible futures, their degree of desirability and inherent risks. This is lacking in PF, since a foresight manager is not responsible for the elements of content, but only for producing a common and desirable vision of the future. Judging from the different Foresight indices (Country Specific… 2002), PF employs the already used Futures Studies methods, the choice of which depends on the foresight manager. The applied methods are not subordinated systematically either to the subject of PF or to consensus-building. Subjective methods are excessively highlighted for the reason that a desirable future cannot be brought to the surface without a subject. PF is successful if it manages to involve in the foresight process the most number of people concerned, the so-called stakeholders, i.e. if it rests on democratic bases. Foresight managers do not reckon with or strive to diminish the errors arising from the unilateral use of subjective methods, as they believe that only the human mind is able to comprehend and feel the total reality and to interpret it when formulating a vision of the desirable future (Sanders, 1998). Errors arising out of the excessive subjectivity of PF, as pointed out by PF specialist literature too, are the following:

-        the participants tend to overestimate the future trends and tendencies which are well publicized and already well known;

-        they tend to underestimate the little probable but possible futures as well as the possibly negative futures, as their attention is focused on the desirable futures;

-        the currently prevailing interpretations of the social present recur in the thoughts projected into the future, in other words, the “spirit of the times” dominates the desirable futures;

-        the participants, especially the laymen, fail to envisage the complexity circles of the future, which makes their field of vision accidental;

-        urging consensus-building may reinforce errors of group dynamics such as the rejection of extreme interpretations of the future or of the possibility of undesirable futures and majority pressure on those embracing minority views (Skumanich-Silbernagel, 1997), for example.

Seeing that consensus-building and the one-sided application of subjective methods are becoming increasingly dominant in PF, we can certainly count on the enhanced presence of such errors if the thus formulated desirable future gets into the mechanism of enforcing and implementing political interests or of managing institutions. All the same, there is a forceful drive to make consensus-building PF the general European practice and characteristic. This is reflected in the different so-called Practical Guides to Technology or guides to Regional Foresight which have been compiled with common European research work. This is a grave error indeed because a certain kind of series of practical procedures is disseminated without the adequate theoretical background in a way that allows no self-correction or further development.

The comparative analysis of FSF and PF concepts and practices shows that they represent two types of foresight interpretations even in relation to their theoretical bases and problems. Although neither possesses a stable theoretical framework as yet, the premise that the two types of foresight are completely different and therefore PF should formulate its theoretical framework outside and independent of Futures Studies seems to be unfounded. Henceforth I set out to substantiate my above-mentioned conclusion with considerations of the philosophy of science and futures; subsequently, I wish to put forward a proposal on how to enrich foresight theory and practice taking into account the matters of the subject and content of foresight.

Is an independent theory necessary for PF? Is FSF or PF the way of the future?

The answer to the question in the title is “no”, since both types of foresight concepts and practices define themselves, their matters of content and applied methods within the framework of a socio-cultural constructionist concept. The endeavours of PF to formulate its own theories are erroneous from several points of view of the philosophy of science and futures.

PF sees as its task only the consensus-based formulation of a community-level desirable future. As I have already mentioned, this endeavour is but one of the possible spheres and tasks of foresight activity as conceived by FSF. There is no doubt about the importance of formulating a consensus-based future, since society as well as the interaction and communication between individuals make up man’s “lifeworld”. This interactive relation and communication, however, gains far better expression in social discourse, which is the sphere where interpretations emerge, are formulated, discussed and transformed. Reaching a consensus is one possible result or outcome, as the ongoing discourse embraces the interpretation, the clash and the coexistence of conflicting concepts as well. This is to say nothing new, but to make a reference to Habermas’ concept; yet it is precisely this reference that makes it necessary to mention Habermas’ concept regarding ideal communication too. He uses social discourse not only in the sense of consensus-building, as that would exclude criticism as the driving force behind social dynamism. By discourse he means ideal (free) communication characterized by equal and mutual participation, which is the only way to level constant criticism at the existing society. (Habermas, 1981). The rules of discourse and consensus-building in politics, on the other hand, always hinge on the prevailing power and interest relations. That is why ongoing politics can constitute the subject of social discourse as seen by Habermas. Criticism, therefore, is a discourse-building and not consensus-building process by nature, though under certain circumstances it can become the latter as well.

Free discourse, just like democracy, is more than the prevalence of the will of the majority; it is also about defending the right of the minority to have its own opinion and interpretation of things. I believe this should hold true for visions of the future as well. For this it is necessary, however, that visions of the future should constitute not only the building blocks of community-level and desirable future images, but should also be the participants of equal rights in the flow of free discourse about the future. Continuous discourse expresses the essence of foresight better than consensus-building even in the field of social theory, as it embraces both the recognition and the acceptance of interpretative conflicts and conflicting interpretations. This leads us yet again to the theoretical questions of the openness of the future, a matter FSF deals with too. FSF considers discourse a developing, open-ended process of comprehension and interpretation in the course of which a community of different future interpretations that understand each other is formed. This community is characterized by the fact that they understand each other’s concepts and outline a wide variety of alternative futures (Masini, 1994, Masini-Sasson, 1994, Inayatullah, 2000 and 2002, Stevenson, 2000).

Discourse is not only a more general concept than consensus-building for interpersonal communication in society, but it also provides a more useful and to-the-point framework to interpret the openness of the future. Consensus always contains, beyond understanding, different concessions, particularly ones that come about as a consequence of a majority view. Extending consensus-building infected with power politics and manipulation as well also endangers the openness of the future. Furthermore, it does not develop the individual’s sense of responsibility for the future, nor any responsible acts by the individual. The only acceptable interpretation of discourse and even the process of consensus-building, therefore, can be one which leaves the individual his right to and responsibility for his own and his community’s future and one which allows him to interpret his own future within the future of his communities as well (Masini, 1994, Bell, 1997). The consequence of forcing a consensus regarding the desirable future may be even more dangerous than accepting a forced consensus in a given matter of day-to-day politics, as there is no greater loss experienced by people than the loss of their future, apart from their life of course.

Individualisation is unstoppable in western civilisation, because individual knowledge grows and individual abilities and life situations become more varied. As a part of this the individual’s future orientation and concerns about the future are increasingly becoming a natural attribute or characteristic of his or her lifeworld. The dwindling or transformation of the welfare state also demands that the individual constantly live in a future-oriented manner, as society takes less and less care of those who do not cater for their own future. Conceived as knowledge society, the future social model accepted for Europe also envisages individuals and communities responsible for their own future, which is why lifelong learning takes centre stage. (EC, 2001). Even if we do not consider Europe’s desirable social future to be implemented as the comprehensive updating of social philosophy, it nevertheless constitutes a practice which already exists and aims to shape the future and which makes it all the more necessary to interpret precisely the content and theory of European PF in a way that fits this view of society. PF with its consensus-building concept is more suited to serving the practice need of the welfare state’s social model than to experimenting with the practice of a future social model with a new practice yet to be shaped.

PF does not look for its theoretical background in or related to FS despite the fact that it would be self-evident. FS has been elaborating and developing for long decades its futures theory and has, in fact, discovered foresight, whose theoretical and practical questions it has been probing for a long time now. No doubt that in certain fields such as Technology Foresight, Regional Foresight and Organizational Foresight there is a burgeoning foresight practice that has developed close ties with political and planning systems, utilizing Futures Research and the methods of FS quite freely. In what follows I wish to support this evidence with further arguments, as my comparative analysis underpinned the similarity between the two types of foresight in the previous point. Now I propose to scrutinize the directions of PF’s independent search for theories and its theoretical errors.

Seeing that PF, emphasizing its consensus-building character, considers itself as a social-sociological phenomenon, it endeavours to define its theoretical framework on a sociological basis as well. (Fuller, 1999, Fuller-Loogma, 2005). It is clear that specialist literature has not questioned that at all. Wishing to take that one step further, I intend to draw attention to the fact that this is by no means exclusively characteristic of PF and, thus, of foresight. First of all, let us suppose that foresight and PF are a social phenomenon belonging to the field of sociology. In that sense the future embodied in foresight and in PF is genuinely engineered by human society and means the future of society. Were this really true, why hasn’t the society desired by people materialised until now and why isn’t it unfolding continuously? Probably because we do not yet know the details of the construction process well enough. This does not impede, however, that we look upon the construction process of the future as a sociological object, in which case the present of the future as well as the unfolding, materialising and non-materialising processes of the future can be the object of our investigation as the dynamics of human relations, discourse and acts. If we adopt this perspective, foresight too can be studied from the point of view of why it is made the way it is made and how it materialises or does not materialise, etc. But then no independent theory is needed for PF, as the application of sociological theories will do for such social-human processes and relations. Searching for an independent foresight theory down this road will not produce the foresight theory, but will make foresight a new area of investigation in sociology. But is this what those who are seeking an independent theory for PF really want? No. What they want is to find the theoretical bases on which visions of the future with a consistent methodology can be formulated and interpreted on the level of different communities and in different subjects.

A similar train of thought might lead to the theory of PF based on political sciences if we regarded consensus-building as PF’s most essential task and trait (Von Schomberger-Guimares-Pereira-Funtowitz, 2005). This would also result in PF becoming completely integrated into political practice.

We enter another dead-end street if we seek an independent theory for PF in action research, in the learning theory or in the theory of communication, because these too are part-sciences, so if we make certain characteristics of PF chosen at random the basis for developing a theory, we list PF among the subcategories of another branch of science every time. Developing a theory, therefore, ought not to start with what PF activity resembles and what characteristics it may have, but rather with what is its essence, its social and human function that differentiates it from the sphere of competence of other sciences. According to our present knowledge, this specificity is how the idea of human future both on the level of the individual and the community is born, spread and how it attempts to materialise. Although there are points of contact, no other field of science but Futures Studies deals with this matter. With this I do not wish to assert that Futures Studies has tackled all the problems related to the theory of the future, only that it is Futures Studies alone that has undertaken the consistent and systematic investigation of this group of questions. Therefore, PF should contribute with its own practical experience to developing the theory of the future within this, and not gain theoretical backup from other sources such as the theories of other branches of science in order to carry on with its practice. Such a source or experience could be the way the need of practice changes and the reflections it may elicit in the theory of the future so that experience could also become another force behind theoretical progress.

Accepting the quest for an independent PF theory, I can imagine that PF should look for its theoretical background within the so-called Standard Social Sciences Model (SSSM), which in actual fact characterizes PF, with its socio-cultural constructionist way of thinking. This model, by the way, is the basic model and theory of all fields of contemporary social sciences. Briefly, it asserts that

-        what is orderly and has content in individual minds is rooted in culture and is socially constructed,

-        culture is passed down from generation to generation and is acquired by the individual in a learning process,

-        the mechanisms of the brain which have evolved throughout time function independently of the content, (there is a general learning algorithm, memory), but it is culture that makes man able to transcend his congenital biological abilities which, by themselves, would produce robot-like, rigid and instinctive behaviour (Barkov-Cormides-Tooby, 1992).

This basic theoretical standpoint interprets all social phenomena and interpersonal relations within society in connection with culture. It promotes the exploration of how dealing with the future, foresight, or making visions of the future are embedded in cultural traditions and human values, and facilitates the depiction of the latter in different futures concepts. The approach of Galtung and Inayatullah called macro-history, as well as Inayatullah’s causal layered analysis (CLA) constitute the consistent transfer of this theory to the methodology of FSF (Galtung-Inayatullah, 1997, Inayatullah, 2000, 2004). I wonder why PF is not linked to SSSM or FSF, based on the same. Probably because critical FS does that (Hideg, 2002), to which PF, especially European PF, does not want to relate. There is also a logical counter-argument against PF joining: e.g. the theory is too static (there are robust cultures behind all human relations and interpretations), which hinders reaction to change and the generating of change, which is a practical requirement in the case of PF.

The fact that SSSM itself is gradually becoming obsolete may constitute another counter-argument. Since it is absolutely incapable of handling dynamics in the field of practice either, the critical social research focusing on the living and changing social present is carried out in so-called action research (Zuber-Skerritt, 1991 and 1996). PF could join action research, but it is far too future-focused and politics-oriented even though it deals with the present of the future alone. Action research, however, does not strive to formulate its own independent theory, and its working is characterized by methodological individualism (Ramos, 2006).

One of the new developments of action research is that it increasingly tends to identify social action with the learning process, which it calls social or action learning (Bandura, 1986, Morgan-Ramirez, 1983). Social learning theory emphasizes the importance of the individual’s independent, appropriate, double-loop learning as well as learning within a group. This concept of learning is present in PF too (Stevenson, 2000, Burke, 2002, Inayatullah, 2006), and the notion of anticipatory action learning is also well applicable to the more efficient solution of certain problems in PF (Salo-Könnölä-Hjelt, 2004). PF, however, is a learning process only in part, because it not only has to bring to the fore the desirable community futures, e.g. with action learning, but it also has to reach a consensus and transmit the consensus-based future to both varying social groups and/or societies and the political sphere. Thus PF can be no more than a special field of manifesting social learning, but this makes its theoretical background neither more complete nor independent.

PF is attracted to social communication theory too, since communication is present both in the joint building of foresight and in propagating and disseminating the results among outsiders. Interpreting PF as a communication process fits in well with those concepts that envisage society as a communication network (Crowley-Mitchell, 1994, Leydesdorff, 2000). Social communication is always multi-faceted and multi-dimensional so the process of giving meaning to the future is but one of the “function modes” of the communication network (Leydesdorff-Van den Besselaar, 1998). According to Giddens (Giddens, 1976, 1979), social communication theory envisages the structural pairing of communication and action, something PF cannot undertake as it specializes only in communication related to the process of giving meaning to the future of the community. PF’s communication theory, therefore, could constitute but a limited segment of social communication theory.

A further theoretical problem stems from the fact that neither action theory, nor learning theory, nor communication theory has developed into a sound social theory; each one exists in experiments of differing interpretations. This leads to the oddity that the central notion and interpretation in social sciences of this construction, under which action, learning and communication as special manifestation forms of interpreting and giving meaning have been included, by now is beginning to coincide with only one of its forms. The different forms are starting to lead independent lives and display the essence of society as a human construction in themselves alone. This is worth noting from the point of view of our subject because the fact that SSSM’s movements are restricted to its own circles is also a result of, among other things, the leaving out and dropping out of historicism and social dynamics from social theory.

As a consequence of theory of science considerations, it can be stated that PF’s independent quest for making a theory as presented above are doomed to failure, as they would only annihilate PF’s theoretical independence. Nevertheless, if PF wishes to secure its own independent futures theory background, it definitely ought to steer towards the futures theory offered by critical FSF. Making an independent theory, as indicated by 50 years of futures studies, is a long-drawn-out process dotted with controversies and research. Carrying on further discourse between the followers of PF and FSF is, therefore, recommended. So is research cooperation, which could enrich foresight theory and would not cancel out the multifarious cultivation of foresight either. Thus the answer to the second question posed in the subheading is: both.

Theoretical questions and considerations for the further development of PF

Theory-making and contributing to theory-making cannot be forbidden territory in the case of PF either. Yet efforts to this effect should rather focus on questions that would induce PF to make its activity more efficient and scientifically well-founded while looking for the answers. In what follows I shall raise such a group of questions important from the point of view of foresight theory-making, outlining their hypothetically possible solutions. This amounts to extending PF’s framework of interpretation to matters of content too.

PF’s greatest merit and achievement lies in the fact that it focuses its activity on bringing to the fore and on shaping the desirable future of human communities. This future materialises in the course of intersubjective interpretive discourse and consensus-building between those involved, constituting a future in the present, which compels people to act and take responsibility.

The central theme of PF at present:

subject – discourse between subjects ® consensus-building, construction of desirable future(s):

-        semantics

-        syntax

-        context

Besides these PF does not pay enough attention to the matter of content of human future, including the desirable future. The fact that matters of content are pushed to the background is a consequence of PF’s socio-cultural constructionist concept and of the almost exclusively subjective methods PF uses.

By matters of content I mean that the future, even the future in the present, is not merely intersubjective discourse, though it is born in the course of that. Although the process of discourse and interpretation is indeed interaction between people, we cannot disregard what the discourse is about and what constitutes its subject. Constructionism deals with this in the system of relations between semantics, syntax and context, as man associates a meaning with something in a given relation and environment. This system of relations is really important from the point of view of discourse, but content and, thus, dynamic aspects are excluded from this even though PF regards interpretation as a process too. Dynamic would be highly important in the interpretation process because of future orientation, but not only in as much as interpretation has its own dynamic and development process but also in as much as the object of interpretation has its effect on the interpretation, which can have its dynamic too, and, moreover, these dynamics have their own interaction. Making these complex dynamics manageable is a challenge for all types of foresight theories and for the whole discipline of Futures Studies.

At this stage I do not wish to enter into the philosophical debate whether there is such a thing as objective reality or there is only reality as interpreted by man. Modern science conceives awareness and knowledge as constantly changing human interpretation and construction, since only man can have awareness and knowledge of the world. The genuinely interesting question for science lies in how this knowledge is created and constructed, how much of it stems from human stimuli and impulses, how much from those coming from the outside world, what role do they each play, and how do the two sides intertwine in the process of interpretation and construction. From the point of view of time human perception seizes not only the moment of right now as a point in time, but can still see what has just happened and is thus also aware of the moment that has just passed. It is aware, furthermore, of passing from now to a new now and, looking ahead, anticipates it. An attentive consciousness and an attentive life (impressions and perceptions) make for the anticipation of the new now. All human perception is always characterized by an original future intention (passing from the past to now), which is invariably linked to experience intentions rooted in the past (Husserl, 1996). Perception is total in as much as it happens not only within certain time limits, but is filled with content as well even when we recall something or apply it to the future. Content entails a mental state, but it must always have a trigger or a source as well.

Husserl, the father of phenomenology, studied perception as a process unfolding within human beings, i.e. always in relation to the way man reacts to the outer world or to the inner reality. This offers two conclusions. One is that perception is the starting point of all interpretation, discourse and human communication, while it is reflexive and self-reflexive as well. The other is that, given the nature of perception and interpretation, it possesses an internal and external dynamic, which merge into complex dynamics. To put it in simpler terms, he who perceives and interprets, what is perceived and interpreted and their end-product, the perception and the interpretation, are all present in the process of perceiving and interpreting, each one of them as well as their interaction being variable.

The constant dynamics of perception, awareness and interpretation can be the subject of philosophy, social and natural sciences alike. The link among them is man, the active individual who is an integral part of an undertaking to create reality (Caputo, 1992). Man, therefore, is an individual with relative independence and autonomy or, as the specialist literature describes him, someone with the characteristics of an agent. He realizes the individual and collective sources of his actions in local and partial activity within the field of his own agency. He activates some collection of the social sources of interpretations made available by the situation, and at the same time he himself becomes active within the interpretations, putting forth (at least relating the interpretations to himself) and using new interpretations in his own and in his community’s life, and thus contributes to increasing the social sources of interpretations (Jensen, 1991, Anderson-Meyer, 1998). From the point of view of our subject this leads us to the conclusion that only man can have foresight, even if it relates to the future of his community. Our second conclusion is that the outer world as well as the relationship between the outer world and man are also important for “an attentive consciousness and an attentive life”.

I believe that socio-cultural constructionism and critical social sciences broke with the latter relation. Recurring to Habermas’ train of thought yet again, social constructionists often refer to society being “lifeworld”, i.e. intersubjective relations, which must be freed from the power of the world of the instrumental mind, i.e. the relationship of subject and object. They tackle this freeing or liberation by transposing the subject-object relation (the relation between man and the outer world, in our terminology) into a relation between subjects. This, however, does not follow from the logic of Habermas. What does follow from it is that the “instrumental rationality”, knowledge of the outer world, serves lifeworld. Habermas, therefore, in no subjectivist and voluntarist in the absolute sense of the word, but someone who claims that man’s inner and outer world can be shaped through the critique of what already exists. Foresight may be one form of critique, to which both types of relations may belong if it builds on the foresight capacity of both types of relations, the foresight capacity of the individual and if it considers as its subject, besides intersubjective relations, subject-object relations as well as their interaction. I think that not even foresight can avoid the subject of complex dynamics. The question that arises is how foresight deals with this subject. Unfortunately, we can provide no simple answer to this question such as take X’s theory or Y’s field of science theory to deduce the answer. As a hypothesis, two approaches can be put forward, however: one is the adoption of Prigogine’s concept of science hypothesis, and the other is that of the evolutionary approach.

Prigogine’s concept of science sets out from the fact that the form in which man, one of the “products” of Nature, manifests himself is able to study and “interrogate” the outer world, Nature (Nature is the word used by Prigogine!), and to interpret the “answers” it provides; in other words, science is a dialogue with reality, the outer world. The “inquirer” sees and perceives dynamics everywhere, which is the reply of the outer world’s nonequilibrium nature to the questions. This dynamic can be perceived, interpreted and constructed in a variety of forms, but is always irreversible in time. It is this irreversibility, evolution, that leads to more and more complex phenomena as well as to the inquirer himself. If this thought is taken one step further, evolution can transcend the inquirer too, as it is the subject of both literature and research on the future, such as for instance the future of artificial intelligence, the mutual integration of natural and artificial intelligence, transhuman and posthuman futures, etc.

Outline of Prigogine’s concept of science: Dialogue with reality

Observer                                 ®                    Dynamics

        ­                                                      ¯

Dissipative structures

        ­

Irreversibility and chance          ¬        Unstable dynamic systems

Source:            Prigogine-Strengers: Order Out of Chaos

                        Flamingo, Glasgow, 1985, p. 301.

This concept of science is in no contradiction to the notion represented by Deluze and Foucault according to which the subject of science is symbolic, the so-called third sphere, as all human cognitive perception has its linguistic manifestation (Deluze, 1975, Foucault, 1971). Language is a form of human perception and cognition as well as of interpersonal discourse. Prigogine, on the other hand, was able to grasp the dynamic nature and interaction of the outer world and (the scientific form of) human perception too. According to his concept dynamics equals to evolution, in other words, it means the formation, perception and symbolic construction of irreversible change. (I wish to note at this point that the general evolutionary theory is something that endeavours to formulate a theory for this approach or this concept of dynamics.)

This concept of science can be extended to all sorts of human perception, while its products, depending on the perception and the forms used to interpret them, may vary from experience, through imagination, myth and science to the arts, etc. From the point of view of practice mention must be made of the fact that it is precisely the achievements of science and technology that prove the relationship between the interpretations and the outer world. That mankind has not become extinct may be an argument to support the view that the human interpretation and construction of the outer world is not completely random, and depends not only on culture, etc., but on the outer world as well. Interpretation and construction are, therefore, no lines of division but a view that expresses an approach to the world: interpretation and construction can be conceived both as merely a human perception, thought or emotion, but also in a manner where the perceived, conceived and emotion-provoking outer world also plays a role and is in dynamic interaction with the human world.

It is worth asking these questions in relation to the future as well, since expectations are inherent in all perception to begin with. Distinguishing and studying the process (conversation, discourse, dialogue and negotiations between people) in connection with human future is worthwhile, but at the same time the content of the subject of the process (what we experience, think, perceive and feel, and why) cannot be ignored either; in other words, the outer world also influences how we interpret the outer world even if we consider it basically unfathomable or something constructed by man alone. What is interesting in such a case is how the signals from the changing outer world are received, what kind of imaginary constructions can be built from them and how they can be used to modify the outer world or ourselves. Unless we are diehard agnostics, experience, science and the arts inform us about the outer world too, and not only about the mental state, system of interpretation, values and beliefs, etc. of man. This can and must be recognised indirectly as well, because we are both biological beings and successful survivors. Every biological being is exposed to the influence of the outer world, to which it must also react. If it makes the wrong reaction, it perishes. Although societies have built many a defensive and risk-preventive system on the basis of knowledge and experience, etc., these have been unable to pre-empt natural catastrophes or bring to a halt the dynamics of the outer world. What is more, these artificial systems even constitute danger for man. It is, therefore, vital that in interpreting the outer world there be continuous dialogue between deciphering and interpreting the meaning, i.e. between the subject and the object, of information obtainable about the outer world and human practice. This dialogue appears as interpersonal dialogue and discourse as well when researchers communicate their findings, work together, discuss and talk to non-academics about science and the nature of the outer world becomes the subject of daily debates and discussions, etc. In the course of foresight-making discourse is also about what the outer world can become, how we would like to see it and what we can do to make it such. Human discourse is, therefore, a complex phenomenon which always has complex points of reference, domains of meaning and interpretation as well as consequences as regards both its subject matter and participants. At least these two circles, levels, loops of discourse and their interaction can today be made the subject of research and experiments in connection with foresight.

PF’s extended and dynamized topic

Subject   -   intersubjective discourse   ®   consensus-building, desirable future(s)   ®   knowledge basis

Construction:

-        semantics

-        syntax

-        context

2

Subject   -   interobject (the presence of the outer world and its dynamic in the symbolic sphere) dialogue   ®   knowledge basis

Construction:

-        dynamic complex systems including man (human agents and multi-agents who observe, evaluate and act)

-        interaction within systems

-        their interaction with their environment

Thus when we target the “inclusion” of dynamics in foresight, we inevitably envisage an evolutionary approach. When that becomes viable, it does not cancel out the constructive approach of PF, or of FSF for that matter, but extends its former sphere of validity and domain of interpretation in relation to content and dynamic.

This extension is nothing but the representation of human experience, namely that man perceives that the future is being and can be shaped at the same time and to a certain extent. Futures Studies theory with a Futures Research aspect has hitherto construed this “mixed experience” on the theoretical level by abstracting in its forecasts what will or may happen from future man. FS, meanwhile, has focused on the human character and plasticity of the future. Yet this step ahead is not without its shadow: while the human nature of the future is stressed, other features of the future, which are not to the liking of or cannot be shaped according to the wishes of man, as well as the mutually influential interaction of certain components of the future which do or do not depend on man, are relegated to the background. The FS trends, both the critical and the evolutionary, juxtapose the unfolding and the created character of the future as competing paradigms, although foresight as such has become part of both trends (Hideg, 2004). I believe, therefore, that the foresight concept proposed for further theory-building is able to handle this dilemma better than the individual trends do by themselves. By researching the discourse and dialogue circles and their interaction we could achieve that the activity and products of PF, and even of FSF, interpret and display the future as near as possible to what is experienced. This might enable the coming into being of what Slaughter calls “Integral Futures”, which means either the competition between different concepts of the future or the mutual recognition of and respect for the views and research work of others. This, however, results in nothing but theoretical considerations, morsels of theories and in methodological pluralism. Perhaps European PF research could undertake to conduct such research too on the basis of critical traditions.

Conclusion

Foresight concepts and foresight practice are at present governed by socio-cultural constructionism. According to specialist literature, there are two main types of foresight concepts and practices: one being foresight as conceived by Futures Studies, namely FSF, and the other being a kind of foresight that stems from the needs of practice but one that increasingly dissociates itself from and makes itself independent of Futures Studies, namely PF.

The comparative analysis of FSF and PF concepts and practices shows that they represent two different types of foresight interpretations as regards their theoretical bases and problems too. Neither of the two has as yet a solid theory, nevertheless the suggestion does not seem well-founded that the two types of foresight are totally different and so PF ought to develop its own theory outside of and independent of Futures Studies.

The trends of PF’s endeavours to develop its own theory – turning towards sociology, political sciences, action research, social theory of learning and communication theory – cannot lead to an independent PF theory, because they are based only on certain features of PF chosen at random, features that display common traits with these theories or branches of science. Theory-building ought not to begin with what a PF activity resembles, but what the essence of PF is, its social and human function, which differentiates it from the sphere of competence of other theories and sciences. This specific trait, however, as far as we know today, consists of how the individual and community concept of human future is born, how it develops, spreads and how it endeavours to materialise. No field of science except Futures Studies deals with that.

If we accept the quest for an independent PF theory, that must be conducted on broader bases. It would be possible to look for an independent PF theory within SSSM, as does FSF. Yet SSSM is far too static from the point of view of practice, as there are robust cultures in it behind all human relations and interpretations, which hinder quick reactions to change and the generating of change, which are practical requirements in the case of PF.

SSSM is gradually becoming outdated. Critical social research dealing with the living and changing social present is now mostly conducted in action research or strives to investigate the social phenomena and processes as a social learning process or as a communications network. None of these provides a solid social theory framework as yet, and each of them stands for a different social theory alternative. This leads to the odd situation in which by now the essential concept and interpretation of the construction in social sciences, under which action, learning and communication have enlisted as the special forms of manifesting interpretation and giving meaning, is identical with no more than one or two of its own forms. The different forms are beginning to lead independent lives and display the essence of society as a human construction only in themselves. This is worth noting because the fact that SSSM’s movements are restricted to its own circles is a consequence, among other things, of historicism and social dynamics being left out of and dropping out of social theory. Thus PF cannot formulate its own theory this way either, though it can no doubt adopt many useful ideas from these theories.

Theory-making or contributing to theory-making cannot be forbidden territory for PF either. It is advisable, however, for PF to focus its efforts to this effect on questions the answers to which can make PF’s own activity more efficient and scientifically well-founded. One such group of questions is extending PF’s interpretation framework to matters of content.

At present PF’s central subject is how to bring to the fore the desirable future of communities through intersubjective discourse. Focusing on intersubjectivity, however, PF fails to pay enough attention to the matters of content of human future, how those are present and how they are to be treated in intersubjective discourse. Starting out from Husserl’s concept of the totality of human perception (attentive consciousness and attentive life), we can draw the conclusion that perception is the starting point of all interpretation, discourse and human communication, and is reflexive and self-reflexive at the same time; furthermore, perception and interpretation by nature possess inner and outer dynamic as well as the combined dynamics of the two. In simpler terms, the process of perception and interpretation contains he who perceives and interprets, what is perceived and interpreted, as well as the result of the process, i.e. perception and interpretation; all these components vary, as do their interactions too.

The constant dynamic of perception, consciousness and inter